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'An Almost Unheard-of Analogy':
Derrida Reading Levinas
Kas Saghafi
This word "other" is very soon, I predict, going to
become absolutely unutterable, given the abuse or the
inflation to which it has fallen victim.
-Jacques Derrida
Show yourself! Reveal yourself to me so that I can see you!
This is the demand-the appeal-that Moses addresses to God.
In the well-known passage from the Book of Exodus, Moses is said to
implore God: "I beseech thee, show me thy glory', (Exodus 33:18 AV).
However, bis entreaty is swiftly denied when God replies: ''Thou canst
not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live" (33: 20). All
that Moses can hope for is to see the "back parts" of God. "But my
face:' he is assured, "shall not be seen" (33: 23).
Hachem Foda, a Professor of Arabic literature, invokes this very
relationsbip between Moses and God in a meeting of several Arab
intellectuals with Jacques Derrida in Rabat, Morocco, that took place
in June 1996. In a paper analyzing a senes of Arabic terms having to
do with the notion of uns (a concept that encompasses sociality and
warm companionsbip with others as weIl as with God), Foda claims
that any communion or relation with God is only possible in terms of
a friendly and intimate relation that one shares with one's neighbors.
Foda refers to KaIabadhi's Treatise on Sufism, whose author quotes the
words of the Egyptian mystic Dhu I-Nun.1 Uns or intimacy with God,
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the mystic is to have said, "is for the one who loves, being at ease with
the beloved [eire a l'aise avec l~ime1" (IND 20). As an example of the
desire for uns, for this intimacy and comfort, KaIabadhi cites the demand
that Moses is said to have placed on God: "Show yourself to me, so
that I can see yoU."2 It is the very desire for uns, according to Foda, that
motivates Moses to want to see God. And the response from God-
"you will never see me"-Foda believes, demonstrates that divinity as
such does not belong to the phenomenal order.3 Thus, having God as
companion, Foda writes, is akin to "having company without
companions;' it is "being with no one [eire avecpersonne]," or "being in the
company of no one [eire en compagnie depersonne]" (!ND 30).
In bis response to Foda's paper, Jacques Derrida not only
highlights the almost Blanchotian reference to companionship with
this some one "who does not accompany me" but also the example of
the relation between Moses and God. What Foda's paper reveals,
Derrida wants to suggest, is precisely the impossibility of being able to
rlgorously distinguish between the relation to the other and the relation
to God. The scene in which Moses asks God to show himself and
God refuses visibili~ Derrida provocatively claims, can in fact be taken
as "theparadigm for all relations to the other [I~ulre],whatever it may be
[quel qu'il soi~, human or divine."4 I~ the other's manner of presenring
itself-in a relation of interruption and separation, dissociation and
disjunction---consists in not ever presenting itself, then, the relation to
alterity in general, this experience of an invisibility in the visible or of
a non-phenomenali~ is a relation where the other "can only present
itself as other, never presentingitself as such" (!ND 226). The condition
of the experience of the other as other is thatwe can never have direct
access to the other side, "to the zero point of this other origin of the
world," in the same manner that there can be no immediate intuition
or originary perception of the alter ego. "Isn't this:' Derrida asks, "the
law of the relation to the other, whatever it may be [quel qu'il soi~, X,
animal, God or human being?"(IND 226). In other words, the law of
the relation to the other entails that all relations to the other, each
relation to every other-and tout aulre est tout aulre---is an interruptive
rapport to the distant, the inaccessible, and the secret
Contrasting bis beliefin the impossibilityofclearly distinguishing
between the relation to the other and the relation to God with Levinas's
thought, whicl1 wishes to maintain a distinetion, however tenuous,
between the two relationships, Derrida asks: ''When Levinas speaks
of the Wholly Other [Tout Aulre], or of the infinitely Other, does he
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speak of God or the other in general?" (IND 226).5 In other words,
can Levinas's Taut Aulre be rigorously distinguished from any other
"other?" Doesn't Levinas "set up [s'installe] an analogy between the
relation of Moses to God and the relation of man to man, that is of
every other to every other, of every other to the wholly other, to every
other of the wholly other, to the utterly other of the wholly other [de
taut aulre d taut aUlre, au tautaulre de tautaulre]"? (!ND 226, myemphasis).
If there is such an analogy between the relation of Moses to
God and the relation to the other, this gives rise to a number of
questions: How are we to read this analogy? How are the terms of the
analogical relation (God, for example) and the analogical relation itself
read in Derrida's work, so that the relatiol1 of Moses to God can be
designated as "the paradigmatic" relation? Further, how is the function
of the paradigm re-worked in Derrida's texts? Finally, and most
importandy, who or what is "the other (I'aulre]" for Derrida?
In what follows, I would like to suggest, that from very early on
(certainlyas earlyas 1964, perhaps even earlier), what has been at work
in Derrida's writings is a sophisticated notion of the other (I'aUlre] that
needs to be distinguished from that of bis contemporaries. Always
written in the lower case, the other, for Derrida, can designate the
alterity of Autru; as weIl as encompassing what has traditionally been
understood as a formal or logical sense of alterity (for example, in the
Hegelian and Husserlian sense) without being reduced to it. Echoing
the concerns of "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida's I'autre, combines
the features of the absolutely other and the alter ego, thus yoking the
Hebraic and Hellenic, while keeping each heterogeneous.
The Last Word: "Violence and Metaphysics"
Derrida's discussion of the relation between Moses and God in
Morocco recalls, of course, an earlier passage in bis first, and now
semina!, evaluation of Levinas's work, 'CViolence and Metaphysics: An
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," where he had quoted
the section from Exoduswith which my essay began.6In "Violence and
Metaphysics" Derrida had taken Levinas to task, arguing that the
descriptions of the relation to Autrui detailed in Totality and Injinity
evoked "the Lord speaking face to face with Moses" (ED 160/108).7
The resemblance of the Face of Yahweh-never explicitly mentioned
in Totality andInjini!y-to that of Autruiwas, for Derrida, the sign of an
"equivocal complicity between theology and metaphysics in Totality
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and Infini!J?' (ED 160/108-9). Levinas's ethics, then, was inevitably
contaminated by an inescapable theological conceptuality, making it
susceptible to a critique of onto-theologyr. Yet, many years mter, Derrida
cites this very relationship of Moses to God as the paradigm for all
relations to the other. How are we to assess Derrida's seemingly
conttadictory account in Morocco in light of bis earlier condemnation?
Is it the case, as many suspect or fear, or as theyalways suspected, that
Derrida has become unseemly religious? Or is Derrida's re-reading of
the analogy between the relation of Moses to God and that of the
relation to the other, part of an enriched approach to Levinas's corpus,
a re-appreciation of Levinas, mainly marked in Derrida's work not
specifically devoted to Levinas--a reconsideration fully aware of the
aporias of giving and generosity, gratefulness and ingratitude-that
has been taking place for more than two decades? Is it perhaps a case
of the reinscription of certain initially censured terms-terms such as
the absolutely other, experience, religion, and so on-allowing the terms
and the relation to Levinas to be read anew?8
In ''Violence and Metaphysics," a long, wide-ranging, detailed,
and dense essay wbich for many in France and elsewhere served as the
first introduction to Levinas's work and has to a certain extent
determined the reception of Levinas's work, Derrida presented
Levinas's challenge to Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian
ontology as a fundamental thinking of the other [/'autre]. In a multi-
riered, complex examination of Levinas's reading of Husserl and
Heidegger, Derrida employed the double gesture of (1) using the
resources of the very thinker criticized by Levinas to pose questions to
Levinas's own interpretations, and (2) in a further twist, using a
Husserlian orientation to question Levinas's interpretation of Heidegger
and a Heideggerian path to criticize Levinas's take on Husserl. Since its
republication in Writing and Dijfercnce in 1967, this complicated essay
has acquired the status of a canonical text, conveniencly becoming the
obligatory reference and final arbiter whenever the question of the
relation between Derrida and Levinas is raised, even though the issues
at stake in it are far from clear.
Even it: since then, Derrida has devoted a number of other texts
to Levinas-in particular, '~t1bis Very Moment in 1bis Work Here I
am" (1980) and Adieu (1996)-and the explicit references to Levinas's
texts have grown exponentially over the years (for example, in Thc Gift
of Death, Politics of Fricndship, u toucher, ]can-Luc Nanry, and "L'animal
que done je suis")-many still seem to eonsider "Violenee and
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Metaphysics" as the last word whenever the relation between the two
thinkers is broached, in particular whenever any discussion of "the
other" is concerned. The other-this term, notion or concept, which
has been worn away by so much misuse, contributing to its banality,
which has become a mantra in so many quarters, serving as shorthand
for liberal concern for diversity and multiculturalism-has become a
liability. There is too much talk of the other, we are told. And yet, we
cannot do away with the other, since the other and the relation to the
other are at the heart of the celebrated chiasm that joins and separates
the oeuvres of Levinas and Derrida.
Part of the difficulty of appealing to ''Violence and Metaphysics"
to resolve all differences and to explain the relation between two thinkers,
however, is that practically all of the complaints or objections addressed
to Levinas have since been affirmatively reinscribed and reworked in
Derrida's own work. Thus, instead of treating "Violence and
Metaphysics" as if it were the last word, as if everything that Derrida
has written on Levinas and the other since 1964 ought to be judged
against the formulations of that text, much care needs to be taken to
avoid conflating the work of the two thinkers and to disentangle the
thought of the other in Derrida from its Levinasian legacy. A more
careful, deliberate, and patient exercise, for example, would consist of
attending to the usage of the term tauIre in a1l of Derrida's texts, in
order to gain a better sense of how it functions in his work-an
enormous task indeed. Yet, even if we turn to ''Violence and
Metaphysics" in a very circumscribed manner and attentively read a
few selected passages where Derrida poses a number of questions to
Levinas, to his reading of Husserl (and the alter ego) and to Levinas's
own notion of Autrui, we may be able to catch a glimpse of the
moments in Derrida's text where it has already begun to pull away
from Levinas, displacing the privilege ofAutruiand articulating another
thinking of the other (I'aulre]. In order to do so, it is necessary to draw
out Derrida's remarks regarding the other in "Violence and
Metaphysics," beginning with Husserl's notion of the alter ego and
then Levinas's notion of Autrui.
Reading Husserl
Undertaking a rigorous re-appraisal of Husserl's work, Derrida
attempts to showin ''Violence and Metaphysics" that, despite Levinas's
criticisms, Husserl's concern has always been with the other as other. It
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is worth noting that the "objections" addressed to Levinas-who after
all co-translated the Cartesian Meditations-audacious though they may
be, revolve around Levinas's interpretations of Husserl. Derrida's
comments particularly address the adequacy of Husserl's account of
the relation to the other. By broaching the topics of the alter ego and
the irreducibly mediate relationship with the other (analogical
appresentation), Derrida demonstrates Husserl's attentiveness to respect
and preserve the alterity of the other. Husserl's descriptions of the
alter ego, Derrida claims, recognize the other as other, in its form as ego
and in its form of alterity:
Derrida notes that a schema undergirds all of Levinas's thought
of the other: the other [I'autre] is other [l'autre] only if its alterity is
absolutely irreducible, that is, infinitely irreducible (ED 154/104)., In
other words, the other is absolutely other, it is "exteriority which can
be neither derived, nor engendered, nor constituted on the basis of
anything other than itself" (ED 156/106). According to Levinas,
Husserl'S determination of the other as alter ego in the Fifth Cartesian
Meditation implies that the other is the same as the ego. Derrida presents
Levinas's argument thus: ''By making the other [l'autre] a phenomenon
of the ego, in particular in the Cartesian Meditation~ constituted by
analogical appresentation on the basis of the ego's own sphere of
belonging, Husserl missed the infinite alterity of the other [l'autre],
reducing it to the same" (ED 180/123). To make the other [l'autre] an
alter ego would be, for Levinas, tantamount to a neutralization of its
absolute alterity.
Let us now follow very closely Derrida's argumentation in
''Violence and Metaphysics" in order to examine how he sets out to
contestLevinas's interpretation and to demonstrate that Husserl's work
is in fact rigorously faithful to the alterity of the other.9 Derrida raises
a number of points, the most important of which are: (1) the status
and (2) appearing of the alter ego, (3) the mediate relationship to the
other or analogical appresentation, (4) the alterity of bodies, and (5)
the economic relationship between symmetry and asymmetr)r.
(1) The AlterEgo as Ego. The criticism that Levinas has leveled at
Husserl is that he maintains that the other [l'autre] as alter ego is known
through sympathy-"as another like myself" (ED 184/125). As we
kno~ for Levinas, Autruiis not simply an alter ego. But for Husserl, as
Derrida points out, the other [l'autre] is never me but "an Ego run
Moz]:' it has the form of the ego (ED 162/110, italics in original).
Thus Husserl understands the other as alter ego to mean "the other as
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other fI'autre comme autre]" (ED 184/125, my italics). Precisely because it
is an ego, it is "irreducible to my ego" (ED 184/125). It is "the egoity
of the other [/'autre]:' Derrida adds, that allows him to say "ego:' and
"this is why he is autmiand not a stone, or a being without speech in my
real economj' (ED 184/125). Husserl recognizes the Other [autmi] "in
its form of alterity [dans sa forme d'alterite]," which cannot be that of
things in the world (ED 184/125). Without the recognition of the
other as a transcendental alter ego, Derrida notes, "its entire alterity
would collapse" (ED 184/125). Thus, for Husser~ the "passage from
Ego [Mol] to the other [/~utre] as an Ego is the passage to the essential,
non-empirical egoity of subjective existence ingeneral"and not a passage
to that of my ego (ED 162-3 /110).
(2) TheAlterEgoAppears toMe. In the Car/esianMeditations, Husserl
is concerned to show ''how the other as other [/~utre en tant qu~utre], in
its irreducible alterity, presents itself to me," appears to me (ED 180-
1/123, my italics). There has to be, Derrlda insistsJ "a cer/ain appearing
of the other as other to an ego" (ED 181/123, my italics). It would be
impossible to encounter the alter ego and respect it in experlence and
language ''without this other, in its alterity, appearing for an ego (in
general)" (ED 181/123). There has to be a phenomenon of the totally
other, "otherwise one could neither speak, nor have any sense of the
totally other [tout-autre], or evidence of the totally other as such" (ED
181/123). But the other as other is "the phenomenon of a certain
non-phenomenality," its mode of appearing is that of "an originary
non-presence" (ED 181/123). Thus Husserl's writings, Derrlda states,
can be said to "describe the system of the phenomenality of non-
phenomenality" (ED 183/125). The other [/~utre], "phenomenality as
disappearance [comme disparition]:' 'appears' but never as such (ED 190/
129). It is this appearing of the other [/~utre] as what I can never be,
Derrida notes, this "originary non-phenomenality:' that is examined
as "the intentionalphenomenon of the ego" (ED 182/123).
(3) The Mediate Relationship to the Other orAnalogicalAppresentation.
Husserl's central concern in the relationship with the other is "the
irreducibfy mediate character of intentionality aiming at [viran~ the other
as other" (ED 182/123). Husserl is most insistent that "the other as
transcendental other (the other absolute origin and the other zero point
in the orientation of the world)" can never be given to me in person,
but only through analogical appresentation (ED 182/124).1°The alter
ego cannot present itseIt: it cannot become an originary presence for
the ego, it can never be given "in person;' thus resisting the principle
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of principles of phenomenology-namely, the intuitive given of
originary presence.11
Derrida notes that the relation of analogical appresentation is
not an assimilating reduction of the other to the same, but rather
"confirms and respects separation, the unsurpassable necessity of
(nonobjective) mediation...If I attained the other immediately and
originally, silently, in communion with the other's own experience, the
other would cease to be the other" (ED 182/124). Contrary to
appearances, appresentative transposition recognizes "the radical
separation of absolute origins, the relation of absolved absolutes [absolus
absous] and non-violent respect for the secret" (ED 182/124).
Throughout all of bis writings, Derrida never abandons the
importance accorded to analogical appresentation in bis reading of
Husserl. Over thirty years later in Le toueher, Jean-Lue Nanry, Derrida,
while praising "Husserlian prudence" as "a model of vigilance,"
reiterates the necessity of turning to analogical appresentation.12Noting
the "unsurpassable abyss [abime infranehissable]" separating me from the
other, Derrida emphasizes that the other ["aUlre] is never given to me
immediately, is never "presented" directly, but is "apprehended" in an
indirect relationship. My access to the body (Leib) of the other, he
writes in Le toucher, is only possible in "an indirect fashion, by
appresentation, comparison, analogy, projection, and introjection" (LT
217). My relation to the other's body, in contrast to the relation the
other has to its own body, can only be through appresentation. The
other, ''Jrom its point of view [de son cote1, whieh will never be mine, has an
originary relation to its body," the same way I have to mine, wbich I
will never have with its (LT 217). I can never have an experience of the
other's body as if I were on its side. Thus "one must be vigilant about
the alterity of the other [ilfaut veiller aI'altente de "aulre]: the latter will
always remain inaccessible to an originary giving [donatriee] intuition, an
immediate and direct presentation of here [ia]" (LT 218). Even though
I may know or feel that "there is an other here [ia]," this other 'here'
presents itself as that which will never be mine. It is not possible to
confuse me and the other because "the alterity of the alter ego can
never be reappropriated in the ownness [Ie propre] of 'my ego'" (LT
220). Bach of ourworlds is untranslatable, Derridawrites, and at bottom
there will never be the 'same world' [au fond il ny aurajamais de «(meme
monde»] (LT 220). There is an irreducible difference between us-I
have a direct and originary intuition of my body and an indirect
appresentation that gives me access to the other. The interiority of the
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other cannot be given to me immediately, it cannot be my interior life.
I have access to the other, but only as other and not as another me.
(4) Things and Alten!) in General. In ''Violence and Metaphysics,"
Derrida is also keen to point out that Husserl's attentiveness to alterity
is not simply confined to that of the alter ego but also applies to the
alterity of things: "Bodies, transcendent and natural things are others
[des aulres] in general for my consciousness. They are outside and their
transcendence is the sign of an already irreducible alterity" (ED 182/
124). Despite Levinas's protestations, wishing to reserve alterity for
Autrui, Husserl maintains that alterity is also applicable "when things
are concerned [quand il s'agit des choses]" (ED 182/124). This
understanding of alterity, according to Derrida, "takes seriously the
reality of the external world" (ED 182/124). What things share with
autmi is a general alterity, as witnessed by the fact "that something in
them is always hidden [se cache aussi toujours], and is indicated only by
anticipation, analogy and appresentation" (ED 182/124).
The already irreducible alterity of the transcendent thing is due
to "the indefinite incompleteness [inachevement] of my original
perceptions" (ED 183/124). Even though the transcendent thing
appears through adumbrations [Abschattungen], in principle "the
possibility of an originary and original presentation" of a hidden side
is always open (ED 183/124). However, in the case of autmi this
possibility is foreclosed. The alterity of the transcendent thing is thus
"incomparable with the equally irreducible alterity of autml' since the
alterity of autmi "adds to the dimension of incompleteness...a more
profound dimension of non-originariness"-the radical impossibility
of being able to "go around ffizire Ie tou~ to see things from the other
side," of being able to experience the lived experience of the other
from the other's vantage point (ED 183/124).
(5) AnEconomicRelation--SymmetryandDis-!Jmmetry. It is important
to note that without the alterity of bodies [les cops] (and autmi is, after
all, also a body), the alterity of autmi could never emerge (ED 183/
124). Derrida underscores that these two alterities-the alterity of
bodies and the alterity of autru~neinscribed in the other, need to
be thought together. This is why the alterity of autrui is doubly
irreducible, "by a double powerof indefiniteness" (ED 183/124). The
other remains infinitely other because "the subjective face of his
experience (vem] from his vantagepoint [de son cote], such as it is lived by
him" is never available to me (ED 183/124). Unlike what belongs to
my sphere of ownness, the experience that the other has of what is
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proper to him will never be given to me originally (ED 183/124).
Yet there is a strange symmetry between me and the other: I am
also the other's other and I know this. Without this "evidence," I could
not "desire (or) respect the other in ethical dissymmetry" (ED 188/
128). It is precisely because "in my ipseity I know myself to be other
for the other [autrepour I'autre]" that the movement of transcendence
toward the other could have any meaning (ED 185/126). No
dissymmetry would be possible without the symmetrical recognition
of the other as ego. Derrida calls this dissymmetry "an economy in a
new sense" (ED 185/126).
This econom.J--which Derrida concedes may sound logically
absurd-is "the transcendental symmetry of two empirical
asymmetries" (ED 185/126).13 This economic relation also entails,
Derrida reminds us referring to Parmenides of the Poem and Plato's
Sophist, that the other [J'autre] is always said pros heteron.14 The other
cannot be absolutely "absolved" of relation to an ego; it cannot be
absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other. In other
words, the other, even though utterly other, according to Derrida, must
have some relation to the same. This would mean that the same cannot
be a totality closed in upon itself, "an identity playing with itself with
only the appearance of alterity" (ED 186/126). Citing Heidegger's
1denti!Y and Difference, where the same presupposes mediation, relation,
and difference, Derrida argues that "the 'play of the Same'" is ooIy
possible when alterity is already lodged in the Same (ED 186/126-7).
(At this juncture it is essential to open a parenthesis to address
the expression "infinitely other" or "absolutely other [absolument autre]"
which, Derrida is to have stated, cannot be said and thought at the
same time. This has led certain commentators, who hold steadfast to
this as an iron-clad rule, to claim that what distinguishes Derrida from
Levinas is that for the former the other can never be said to be "absolutefy
other." However, this would make it difficult to explain away the use
of "the absolute other [I'autre absolu]" in Donner Ia mort (DM 97/68)
and in arecent essay "L'animal que donc je suis" (L'animal
autobiographique, 261) or comments such as: every other is "absolutely
other [absolumentautre]" or "infinitely other [inftnimentautre]" (DM 110/
78). A solution to this apparent contradiction or paradox can be found
in exploring the expression ''Tout autte est tout autte" which Derrlda
has used in a number of texts.15 For Derrlda, there is a relation to the
other who remains absolutefy other, singular and unique).
The transcendental symmetry of two empirical asymmetries, the
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alterity of things, the mediate relationship to the other or analogical
appresentation, the egoity of the alter ego and the necessity of its
appearing, make up the core of Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's
writings on the other, which insist that Husserl's work, by providing a
rigorous account of the relation to the other as other, has always been
thoroughly attentive to the alterity of the other. Even though Derrida
provides an account of Husserl's work that differs from Levinas (for
example, Levinas would deny that Autrui is an ego), he is insistent that
no matter the particular interpretation or use of terminology (e.g.,
alter ego) Husserl's work is most attentive to the alterity of the other.l6
Following an examination of Husser~Derrida then turns his attention
to Levinas's notion of Autrui.
:Levinas's Autruiand Derrida's ]'autrel7
As noted above, throughout his own writings, particu1arly from
Totall!) and Inftni!J onward, Levinas makes abundantly clear that the
absolutely other is Autrui, that is, only Autrui can be absolutely other.l8
This "schema," Derrida emphasizes, underpins all of Levinas's thought
on alterity (ED 154/104). In "Violence and Metaphysics" Derrida
attends to both components of this axiom, scrutinizing what Levinas
means by the terms "absolutely other" and "Autrui." We shall now
examine the latter.
According to Levinas ontology has always conceptualized and
totalized, hence neutralized, the relation to the other [I'autre]. But this
relation-neither mediate, nor immediate--cannot be totalized by a
concept of relation (ED 134/90). It is not possible to conceptualize
the encounter, since the encounter itself is made possible by the other
[I'autre]. The infinitely other, resistant to all categories, cannot be bound
by a concept or thought on the basis of a horizon, since the concept
supposes an anticipation and a horizon. For Levinas, the encounter
with the other has the form of separation, the ttace of which is at the
heart of all experience (ED 141-2/95).
The infinitely other is invisible; it shows itself or appears in a
certain non-manifestation (ED 135/91). It is in the face that the other
is "given over in person as olher [livre enpersonne comme autre], dlat is, as
that which does not revea1 itseIt: as that wmch does not allow itself to
be thematized" (ED 152/103). The face wmch "is not of 'the world,'"
can only be reached as the inaccessible, the separate, the invisible, the
intangible, and the secret (ED 153/103).
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If"the existence of autrui"escapes conceptualization, then what
can be said about autmz? (ED 154/104). Who orwhat is autmt? Despite
appearances, as Derrida points out, there is no concept of autmi (ED
154/104). In French, Autmi is not an adjective, or a pronoun; it is a
substantive (i.e., it functions syntacticallyas a noun but is not a noun or
a species of a noun). It is not a proper noun or a common noun either,
and unlike the Greek category of the other in general, i.e. heteron, it
does not take the definite article and admits no plural. Quoting the
entry from the Uttre, which states: '~utrui, from alter-huie, this other
[,~I aulre] . ...Autrui is less general than « /es aulres »," Derrida asks how
are we then to understand what 1S meant by autmt? (ED 155/105).
I would now like to turn to a couple of passages from a long
paragraph in ''Violence and Metaphysics" where, urging us to reflect
upon ''Aulrui in an artisan-like way," Derrida's text indicates a schema
for a re-reading of Levinas, at least of the terms autrui and l'aulre (ED
154/104). Taking note of Derrida's emphases-he uses the phrase
« 11 faudrait reflechir » five times on two pages-I would like to show
how Derrida subdy questions the prominence and priority of the alterity
of Aulrui in Levinas's work (ED 154-5).
After citing the etymology of ~4Htrui,Derrida wonders whether
its capitalization, does in fact reinforce its neutrality: ''\Ve would have
to reflect upon this word 'Aulrui'in an artisan-like way (Ilfaudrail tiJleehir Je
fa!,on arlisana/e] ...this word 'Autru? circwnscribed in silence by the capital
letter which ever increases the neutrality of tlle olher ~'aulre] ...even
tllough it is tlle very disorder of conceptuality" (ED 154/104-5). N ext,
in a difficult passage, Derrida highlights the relation of /1ulrui to heteron,
the Greek genre or category of alterity relative to a point or term:
We should have to examine patiently [11faudrait reflichir
patiemmenij what emerges in language when the Greek
thought of hetero» seems to run out of breath [semble
sessottflt'1j when faced by -rhe alter-huic, seems to become
incapable [semble devenir impuissal1te] of mastering what it
alone, however, is able to precomprehend by concealing
it as alteri!J! (other in general) [dissimulant comme alterite (autre
en genera~J, that which, in return, will reveal to it the
irreducible center of its meaning (the other os autrui)
[(/~utn comme autna)]. (ED 155/105)
It is worth examining, Derrida notes, whether heleron does "run
out of breath" and whether it does become incapable oE mastering
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what it only is able to pre-comprehend, i.e. Autrui. Does heteron, Derrida
seems to be asking, concealAutrui as other in general? 1s it not worth
reflecting on whether, as Levinas claims, Autrui is the "irreducible
center" of the Greek thought of heteron? Levinas's resistance to the
thought of heteron is a protest against the relativization of Autrui.
According to Levinas, Autrui always falls outside the general and
comparative Greek category of other. If: as Levinas holds, heteron has
always concealed and pre-comprehended Autrui as alteri~ as other in
general, then, Derrida acids: "We would have to examine [11faudrait
rfjlechi~ the complicity of this dissimulation and pre-comprehension
which is not produced within a conceptual movement, because the
French word autrui does not designate a category [epece] of the genre
aum." In other words, Derrida is questioning whether there has been a
"complicity" to dissimulate autrui.
Perhaps careful attention needs to be paid to a thought of I'autre
in general, which should not be mistaken for that of a genre: ''We
should have to examine [11faudrait reflechiij this thought of l'autte in
general (which is not a genre), Greek thought within which this
nonspecific dtfference realizes Qtself in) our history" (ED 155/105). But
how can we understand a thought of I'autre ingenera/which would not
be a genre? Here, we arrive at the crux of Derrida's questionioning of
Levinas. Derrida queries: ''Even earlier [plus t04: What does autre mean
before the Greek determination of heteron and the Judeo-Christian
determination of autrut?"(ED 155 /105).19 Derrida is aware that such a
question would meet ttemendous resistance from Levinas, who would
"contest it profoundly" (ED 155/105). For, according to Levinas, only
the interruption of autrui would allow access to the absolute and
irreducible alterity of the other. Derridagoes on to add that ''we should
have to examine, therefore, this Huicof autrui [11faudrait donc rfjlechirace
Huic d'autrut] whose ttanscendence is notyetof a thou [tOt]:' nor perhaps
that of a He [14 (ED 155/105).20Should a thinkingof I'autre be limited
to a choice between the invisible transcendence of autrui, 14 or that of
a Buberian thou, tOt? 1s there the possibility of another option?
Derrida's dense, suggestive passage urges us to reflect, in an
artisan-like fashion no less, (1) upon the two Latin components of
Autrui---(a) the Huic, the this, and (b) the alter, the other, of alter-hui[;-
but, even more profoundly, (2) calls for a thinking of l'autre prior or
anterior to both heteron and Autrui:
1. (a) The "Huicof Autrui:" We know from Levinas's work that
the Ihisof autruirefers to thisother human [/'autre homme] , differentiating
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it from aIl other forms of alterity. Autrui is thus the privileged form of
alterity-this (huic)) and not that, other (altef). By calling attention to the
absolute singularity of the this, doesn't Derrida intimate that the this,
the Huic need not only refer to this other human, but also to others, to
all that is altdr
(b) The alter of alter-buk In conttast to Levinas, Derrida in his
reading of Husserl emphasizes the other as alter ego. To have a relation
to the other as alterego means to have a rapport with the other as other, an
otherirreducible to myego, precisely because it is an ego (see above seetion
on Analogical Appresentation). Levinas seems to have w1derestimated
or played down the alterity of the alter in alter-huic.
2. Derrida's very schematic comments here point toward a thinking
of the other [/'autre], anterior to heteron and autmi (ED 155/105). As we
knO\\T, Levinas refuses to assimilate Autrui to heteron) smce the former
cannot refer to a general alterity or an alterity relative to a term. But, as
Derrida demonsttates, referring to the notion ofheteron in Plato's Sophist;
heteron must not simply be thought in opposition to autmi. Derrida poses
this question to Levinas: ''But how to think or say 'autrui' without
reference-we do not say reduction-to the alterityofheteronin general.?"
(ED 186-7/127). Can there be a thinking of alterity that utterly absolves
itself from relationality?
Heteron no longer has "the restricted meaningwhich permits simply
opposing it to that of autmi, as if it was confined to the region of real or
logical objectivity" (ED 186/127). If: as Derrida remarks, heteron belongs
"to a more profound and originary zone than that in which is deployed
this philosophy of subjectivity still implicated in the notion of autrui,"
then autmimust be thought with heteron (ED 186/127). A thinking of the
other, I'autre, would not then be simplya thinkingof otherness ingeneral,
or alterity relative to a term, or this absolutely other, Autrui, understood
as this other human being and not any other being. A thinking that
thinks the singular this of autrui and the heteron together at the same time
would be, for Derrida, a thought of I'autre-prior to its simple
determination as this other human or a general alterity-the thinking
and writing of which becomes further refined in Derrida's own work.21
The Relation to the Other
What does the account of the relation to the other in "Violence
and Metaphysics" teach us? What conclusions can be drawn about the
relation to the other? Would it be desirable even to provide a formal
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account oE this relation? Would such an account be able to do justice
to the singularity oE the other or would it run the risk oE hypostasizing
the other, endangering its alterity and thematizing what it seeks to
investigate? In trus essay Derrida praises "the nature oE Levinas's
writing," bis way oE proceeding, "masterfully progressing by negations,
and by negation against negation. Its proper route [Sa voiepropre]," he
writes, "is not that oE an 'either this...or that' [«ou bien .. .ou bien»] but
oE a 'neither trus ...nor that' [<<ni .. .non plus»]" (ED 134-5/90). Thus
one oE the finest features oE Levinas's writing is that it does not attempt
to define or grasp the other, but its insistent rhythm strives to respect
the singularity of the other. For, as Levinas comments, the relation to
the other is "prior to the negative or aEfirmative proposition; it first
institutes language, where neither the no nor the yes is the first word"
(fI 32/42). It is necessary then to attend to the singularity oE the other
each time, while at the same time, attempting like Levinas to provide as
nuanced an account as possible.
There can never be a relation to the other as such, Eor the other
never appears as such. One can only have a relationship to the other as
other. To have a relation with the other as other is to have a relation with
the distant, the secret, and the invisible, beyond proprie~ restitution,
and the present, "there where the as such oE the other eludes [se dirobe]
phenomenality."22 My relation to the other is a relation to that wrnch
cannot present itself as such, never appears as such but only appears in
disappearing. My relation is a relation to that which is not present,
since if the other were actually present as such I would be able to
appropriate it in my field of experience and itwould be a phenomenon
forme.
However, the relation with tout aulre as such is a relation. This
rapportsans rapportis aparadoxicalrelationship: ''A relationwithout relation
to any other relation," a relation with that which because of its "alterity
and transcendance makes the relation impossible."23 In order to enter
into relation with the other, it is necessary that an interruption be
possible and that the relation be "a relation of interruption." However,
this interruption does not simply interrupt the relation with the other;
rather it opens the relation to it. In fact, all social bonds and ries
presuppose and are made possible by such an interruption. As well as
a relation of interruption, there is simultaneously a certain mediation
in the relation to the other. In this other experience of mediation-
not to be confused with a relation of reconciliation and totalization-
the other is understood as other in a certain relation of
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incomprehension. It is necessary that, at a given moment, the other
remain as other.
Thus the relation to the other is twofold: there is (1) a suspension
of opposition between binary oppositions, a mediation without
opposition. At this moment one is in economy: between all oppositions
there is no distinction or opposition, there is a difference (e.g. between
nature and culture, where culture is nature differed and deferred, etc.),
and at the same time (2) precisely because it suspends the opposition,
there is a radical heterogeneity, the mark of radical difference or
aneconomy. The relation to the other then is constituted by the two
logics of economy (mediation without opposition) and aneconomy
(radical alterity), relation and interruption of relation, interruption and
negotiation.
Resemblance to God
Let us now return to the analogy between the relation to the
other and the relation of Moses to Godwithwhichwe began. Areading
of analogy, as we shall shoW; is already hinted at in "Violence and
Metaphysics:' but it is Derrida's subsequent work on analogy that will
enable us to read the analogical relation as resemblance anddifference,
economy and aneconomy.24 ''The question of analogy" is itself raised
in a discussion of the relation of Levinas'work to Hegel's (ED147-8/
100). It is worth noting that Derrida italicizes the term "analogy" there,
thus signaling that it is not being used in a conventional manner.25 This
practice is true of practically every reference to analogy in Derrida's
work. Referring to Levinas's statement that ''Thought is language and
is thought in an element analogous to sound and not to light," Derrida
asks: ''What does analogy mean here, difference and resemblance, a
relation between the sensible sound and the sound of thought as
intelligible speech, between sensibility and signification, the senses and
sense?"(ED 147-8/99). Levinas employs an unusual analogy relating
thought to speech in terms of sound rather than vision and light, an
analogy rarely used in philosophy (hence one of the reasons for
Derrida's subsequent use of the phrase "an almost unheard-of
analogy''). If, according to Levinas, thought is language and more akin
to sound than to light, then thought is being equated with speech, a
living speech. Further, if: as Levinas claims, thought hears the invisible
(God), then all speech [discours] would be a conversation with God.
We know that in Totali5 andInftni5 the ethical relation withAutrui
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is speech or discourse [discours] and thatAutrniis encountered in speech
(TI 51/43). Discourswould be the relation to the other as interlocutor.
In the relation to the other, Autrni's manner of presenting itself is
called "expression," and the face expresses itself kath auto. Trus is why
Derrida can point out that the relation to the face in Levinas is only
understandable in light of a certain resemblance of man to God (ED
159/108-9). Quoting from one of the "Conclusions" of Totali!J and
Inftnity, Derrida notes that "Autrni resembles God" (ED 159 /108).26It
is this very resemblance-"the reserrLblance between man and God,
man's face [visage de l'homme] and the Face of God [Ja Face de Dieu]" (ED
159/108)-no matter how radically thought by Levinas, which Derrida
ultimately objects to, as it is the source from which both humanism
and theology derive their impetus.27
In Totality andInftni!J, Levinas cautions us that "it would be false
to qualify [the relation to the absolutely other] as theological" (TI 32/
42). Even though "the dimension of the divine opens forth from the
human face," our relation with the other is "an ethical behavior and
not theology:' not "a knowledge by analogy of the attributes of God"
(TI 76/78). ''There can be 00 'knowledge' of God," he later adds,
"separated from the relationship with meo. Autrui is the very locus of
metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relations with God"
(TI 77/78). Thus, Levinas further elaborates, "Autrui is not the
incarnation of God, but precisely by bis face, inwhich he is disincamate,
is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed. It is our
relations with men... that give to theological concepts the unique
signification they admit of" (fI 78-9/77). Despite all of Levinas's
qualifications, what Derrida still finds troubling in Totali!J andInftni!J is
the complicitous relationship of theology and metaphysics (ED 160/
108-9).28
Derrida notes: ''The face-to-face is thus not originally determined
by Levinas as the vis-a-vis of two equal and upright men. The latter
supposes the face-to-face of the man with bent neck and eyes raised
toward God on high" (ED 158/107). In this resemblance, ''The Face
of God" commands while hiding itsel±: disappears in showing itself:
What Derrida detects in this passage, and other passages like it, are
evocations of the Face of Yahweh. Derrida cites the passage from
Exoduswith which I began, in which speaking face to face with Moses,
God says: ''Thou canst not see my face [maface]: for there shall be no
man see me and live...thou shall see my back parts: but my face shall
not be seen" (Exodus 33:20-23).29 Derrida coocedes that "the face [Je
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visage] is neither the face [JaftUl'] of God nor the face [Jafigure] of man:
it is their resemblance. A resemblance which, however, we must think
before, or without, the assistance of the Same" (ED 161/109).30 (As
we shall see, Derrida's comments in Rabat will enable us to think this
resemblance otherwise.)
The resemblance between the face and God's visage also sets up
an analogy between speech between men and discourse with God:
\'ia the passageway oE this resemblance, man's speech
can be lifted up [re-monte~ toward God, an almost unheard-
oE analogy [analogiepresque inouie] which is the very movement
oE Levinas's discourse on discourse, on speech [dircours de
Levinas sur le dtscours]. i\.nalogy as [romme] dialogue with
God: 'Speech [Le Discours] is conversation with
God....Conversation with God, and not in God as
participation. Conversatton '\\'ith God, and not discourse
on God and his attributes as theology. (ED 159/108)
This "almost unheard-of" analogy, Derrida writes, is also the
movement of Levinas's own discourse. In other words, Levinas's
discourse (on discourse, that is, speech with God) is itself a speech
addressed to God, making the status of bis text, oE an his writings,
analogous to a conversatton or dialogue with God The nudity oE the
face-speech and look-is analogous to divine speech, the speech
rl1at instantaneously presents the speaker. The relation to God, in
language and conversation, is therefore pre-supposed in every face-to-
face, and speech with God, always in the background, serves as
"guarantor" for all face-to-face relations. 1t is in trus sense that Derrida
can write, paraphrasingLevinas, that the dissymmetrical relation to the
other "is, perhaps, the very presence of God" (ED 159/108). Yet this
"presence" is a strange presence:
Presence as separation, presence-absence as resemblance,
but resemblance which is not the 'ontological mark' oE
the worker imprinted on bis product (Descartes) or on
'beings created in his image and resemblance'
~·Ialebranche),a resemblance which can be understood
neither in terms of communion or knowledge, nor in
terms oEparticipation and incamation. (ED 159-60/108)
For Levinas, this resemblance, which is not a sign or an effect of
God, places us "in the Trace of God" (ED 160/108). But it is precisely
this "resemblance" of man to God, the determination of Anlrui by its
58
~ ALMOST UNHEARD-OF ANALOGY'
resemblance to God, which prevents the face from appearingin relation
with other beings: "It is the analogy between the face and God's visage
[Ie visage avecJaface de Dieu] that, in the most classical fashion, distinguishes
man from animal....Man's substantiality, which permits him to be face,
is thus founded in his resemblance to God who is thus the Face [Le
Virage] and absolute substantiality" (ED 210/142). Levinas's theological
conceptuality---or at least his rhetoric-reinforces the identification
of the absolutely other as Autrui, my fellow human, and not as thir
other, whether animal, living, non-living, etc. Derrida remarks that
Levinas's use of the language of "substance" ("perhaps man alone is
substance"), refers us to the scholastic problematic of analogy, but he
prefers to leave trus issue aside (ED 210/143).31
Rethinking Analogy-Difference and Resenlblance
The relation to the other opens up aspace that is not necessarily
simply theological but can also function as the source of theological
discourse. As Derrida remarks regarding Levinas's entire enterprise,
"trus return to experience and 'to the things themselves,' as a relation
to the infinteQy) other is not theological, even if it alone has the power
afterward to found theological discourse" (ED 159/107-8). If God,
the most proper name, were not thought of as a substance, an ineffable
Being, apresence, a final anchor term, but rather was the name of an
"endless desertification of language,"32 if the name of God were the
result of an always possible "movement of the effacement of the
trace in presence" (ED 160/108), then the 'theological' would be, as
Derrida writes in Of Grammato/gJ, "a determinant moment in the total
movement of the trace,"33 an "effect of the trace" (ED 160/108). God
would be, a "nominal effect" within "the chains of substitutions of
names:' a name substituting yet another totally other for the wholly
other.34This possibility of infinite substitution, the infinite substitution
of the infinite, allows "God" to stand for the name, one of the
substitutable names, of the unsubstitutable. Such an account would,
of course, break with all the monothcistic doctrines of the oneness,
uniqueness, and unsubstitutability of God. It is said that the absolute
uniqueness of Yahweh does not lend itself to analogy, yet in trus
uniqueness and irreplaceability analogy begins.35 Thus when we say
that the relation to the other resembles the relation ofMoses to God,
we mean that not only is there a formal resemblance between the two
relations but that "the other" shares a number of characteristics with
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what we call "God." There is a structural analogy between the two
relations.
In traditional analogy either (a) two quantities of the same kind
are in a direct relation where the value of one determines the value of
the other (proportio), or (b) there is a similarity or resemblance of relations,
similitude proportionum, between the terms (proportionalitas).36 The
etymology of "analogy" [ana-logia]-the repetition (ana) of a logos (of a
relation or a ratio)-points to the possibility of a convertibility or
conversion and a reversibility, since ana means reversal as weil as
repetition (as return, reversion, and inversion).37Thus analogy implies
a double movement: the repetition of an initial relation and the
reversibility or reversal of a relation.38
For Derrida, analogy is ttaditionally anel10red by the proper name
or noun [idion onoma], where the proper name functions as "the
nonmetaphorical prime mover of metaphor," as a first term or
causa1i~39Traditionalanalogy-whatDerridahas elsewhere called "ana-
onto-logy," which is dominated by the necessity of "the appearance as
such of the as such, of the ai'-is governed by the proper name of the
logos outside and beyond language. The origin of analogy has always
been logos-reason and word-what "regulates all analogy and which
itself is not analogica.l."40The analogical chain proceeds from and always
comes back to an origin, to truth, whose value governs the entire chain.
This return is guided by the function of resemblance (homoiosis): the
proper and the metaphor reflect and refer to each other, where the
proper noun has a single sense and means only one thinge The logical
and metaphysical anteriority of that which is resembled is never
contested. Traditional analogy also assumes that the identity of the
terms in the analogical relation and their relationships are evident,
known, and stable. In od1er words, all the terms are either present or
can come to presence.
The relation or analogy between two relations is itself dominated
and named by one of the terms within the relation of relations, for
example, in our case, God. The name of the relation is the same as that
of one of its terms and all the terms are comprehended in the structure
of this one term. ''This comprehension:' accorcling to Derrida, "is an
act of domination and decision."41 Thus the relation itself is comprehended
and decided in favor of one of its terms. "God," then would dominate
the other terms of the analogy, swallowing them up, incorporating
them.
For Derrida, in the analogy of the relation to the other to that of
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the relation of Moses to God-analogy displaced, analogy otherwise,
an almost-unheard of "analogy:' analogy and heterology-what the
terms of the analogy name, for example "God" or "the other," are not
the proper names referring to a unique thinge The analogy does not
refer back to a fixed term or an undivided origin. The relation to both,
the other and God, is an indirect, reticent rapport to a certain obscurity
and remoteness. What both relations have in common is a structural
similarity: both are asymmetrical relations to that which is infinitely
distant, to what cannot be seen or immediately presented. The
description of one relation-for example, the characteristics of the
relation to the other-can then shine a light, albeit a nocturnal gloW;
on the other relation.
Following the same logic to its limit, we could say that the relation
to the other and the relation of Moses to God are at once analogous,
they share a certain functional analogy (hence this relation could be
inscribed in an open series which would contain many other analogous
relations) and also remain entirely singular, irreducible to one another,
offering no guarantee of analogy: Each relation, utterly unique, singular
and irreplaceable, is part of a specific semantic or tropological system,
and can be substituted by anotl1er. Each relation is apart of aseries,
but is also able to comprehend the whole and stand for all the others.
If there is an analogy between the relation of Moses and God, analogy
is here understood in a new sense, combining "the economy of
analogy-the same only differed, relayed, deferred [rporte]-and the
rupture of all analüg}T, absolute heterology:"42It is an interrupted analogy,
which once interrupted, is again resumed as an analogy between two
absolute incommensurable heterogeneities.
Paradigm and Series
Thus, the relation between Moses and God can be taken as the
paradigm, paradeigma, example, for a1l relations to the other. In both
cases a demand is made for the other to show itself ("montre-toi''),
and each time this demand cannot be fulfilled. What is asked to show
itself cannot show itse1f in person; it erases itself in 'presenting' itself:
disappearing in its appearance. Hence there can be no relation to the
other or to God as such, there can only be a relation to the other as other.
The relation of Moses to God is exemplary and can function as
the paradigm for all relations to the other, but this paradigm has no
absolute privilege with respect to other relations in the open-ended
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series oE relations in which it is inscribed and that it makes possible.
The paradigm here is neither the producer nor the generator from
wbich a copy emerges. It is not at the origin, arche, or the model already
there, in nature, from which other relations originate. This series without
commencement or end, without origin or hierarchy; is composed oE a
chain oE relations, an open series oE relations, each unique and
irreplaceable. The relation oE Moses to God is a part oE this series,
wbich we may just as wen call, without paradigm, but apart that can
always comprehend the whole. IE the series oE relations are analogous
it is in their disjunction-they are interlaced but interrupted at intervals.
Read in this manner, even iE the relation oE Moses to God is to
be considered as the paradigm oE all relations to the other, the
relationsbip to the other need not necessarily be a "religious" relation
understood onto-theologically. In ''Violence and Metaphysics" Derrida
Eound it objectionable to call the relation wbich opens ethics, this bond
or tie, religion. At that time, Derrida demonstrated that Levinas was
unable to escape the theological ambit oE bis thought, that he was
unable to keep the philosopbical texts and the confessional, theological
writings apart.43 Since those early pronouncements Derrida's own work
has undertaken a serious engagement with religion, and he would be
more tempted to accept the term religion, as long as this relation could
be understood as the inescapable relationship to a non-thematizable
X, a relationwithout relation to the totally other rather than an organized,
positive, revealed religion.44 Yet he would still maintain that Levinas's
insistence on keeping the two realms separate leads to a metaphysical,
onto-theological thought.
For Derrida, the impossibility oE rigorously separating the two
relations-the relation oEMoses to God and the relation to the other-
from one another is precisely the very condition oE any relation or
address to the other. What cannot be denied is the primal importance
oE the relation to the other, an undeniable tie or "bond" that precedes
all determined communi~a1l organized religion, every onto-anthropo-
theological horizon. This bond would be what would link singularities
to each other beEore any social or political determination. Thus what
both sides oE analogy between the two relations point to is the law of the
relation to theoth~ tie prior to all anthropo-theology; a relation anterior
to the bond between men, and prior to what links man to God. To
have a relation to the other as otheris not to simply have respect for the
other as human subject, which Levinas's notion of Autruiwould seem to
insist on, it is to be in relation with that wbich comes, beyond being,
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whose identity is always yet to be determined. Perhaps the resemblance
of the other to God as the movement of the ttace is that very "space"
in which the undecidable coming of the other occurs. It is in this way
that the coming of the other "can no longer be confused with the
God or the Man of onto-theology or with any of the figures of the
configuration (the subject, consciousness, the unconscious, the self,
man or woman, and so on)." 45
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metapqysique et de morak 69:3 (1964): 332-345 and 69:4 (1964): 425-473.
7 Autrni is often rendered in English as "others" (e.g., Harper Collins-
Rnbert French Dictionary); however, in translations of Levinas the term is
customarily translated in the uppercase as "the Other" to indicate that Levinas's
concern is always with a human other. For Levinas, Autrui is a concrete
reference to the other person, to the empirically human, whereas the use of
Autre tends to stress the formal sense of alteriqr, even though he is not
consistent about this throughout bis writings. The French Rnbert dictionary
provides the following entry for autmi: "(pronom)-altrui 1080, cas regime
de autre; un autre, les autre hommes." The following etymology can be found
in the Littri: "Proven<,;al altrni, autrui; ital. altmi; de alter-huic, cet autre, a un cas
regime: voila pourquoi autmi est toujours au regime, et pourquoi autrni est
moins general que /es autres." Perhaps, like the translators of Being and Time
who chose not to translate Dasein, philosophical English should adoptAutrui
as a more acceptable term than "the Other." This practice is followed by
Susan Hanson in the translation of Blanchot's The Infinite Conversation. Since
one of the purposes of this paper is to disentangle the different conceptions
of the term "othe!" in the works of Levinas and Derrida, I have retained the
French terms throughout in my essa)T. Also, I have maintained Derrida's use
of the lower case l'autre, the other, in order to emphasize how he utilizes this
term.
8 The complex relation between Derrida and Levinas, involving a
number of texts over the course of decades, would naturally require a careful
analysis that cannot be undertaken hete. It needs to be remembered (1) that
''Violence and Metaphysics" mainly treats Levinas's early writings (Derrida
notes that bis essay was already written before the publication of "The Trace
of the Other" in 1963), and (2) that certain terms and motifs have shuttled
back and forth between the two authors and a nuanced reading of the relation
between the two thinkers would have to take into account this mutual re-
reading. My concern in this essay is not whether Derrida's interpretation of
Levinas is "accurate," nor is it to provide Levinasian "responses" to any of
Derrida's "objections."
9 Since the aim of this essay is to attend to Derrida's reading of
Husser!, we would have to leave aside an examination of Husserl's own texts.
It is worth noting, however, that throughout bis writings, from the Husserliana
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volumes XIII-XV Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektiviiit (1905-35) to Formal
and Transcendental Logic and the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl maintained that
there ean be no presentation (Gegenwä"rtigun~of the other's lived experienees.
I can never have unmediated aeeess to the other. Sinee the other eannot be
given in flesh and blood, it never offers itself onginaliter [originätj, it ean only be
analogieally appresented. In the Cartesian Meditations Husserl insists that the
experienee of the other, Fremderfahrung., is not an inferenee from analogy or
reasoning byanalogy (§50). Apperception is not a thinking aet or a projeetion,
rather the relation to the alter ego or the alien (Husserl uses the adjeetive das
fremde) is a transfer, an analogizing transposition. Husserl uses the terms
analogization [Analogisierung] and analogon frequently to signify a proeess rather
than astate. See, for example, Hua XIII, 265 and CM § 44, Hua I, 125: ''Tbe
other [derAndere] is my analogon."
10 For another referenee to analogieal appresentation, see VOice and
Phenomenonwhere Derridawrites: "outside the transcendental monadie sphere
of what is my own (mir eigenes), the ownness [Japropriete] of my own (Eigenhei~,
my own self-presenee, I onlyhave relations of analogicaloppresentation, of mediate
andpotential intentionality, with the other's ownness [Jepropre d'aulrut], with the
self-presence of the other; its primordial presentation is closed to me [Ie
presentation onginaire m'est interdite]." La voix et Je phenomene (paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1967),42; translated by David Allison as Speech and
Phenomena (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 39.
11 See Jaeques Derrida, "TI faut bien manger:' Points de suspension:
entretiens, ed Elisabeth Weber (paris: Galilee, 1992), 278; translated by Peter
Connor and Avital Ronell as ''Eating WeIl," Points ...: IntenJiews, 1974-1994,
trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),263-4.
12 Jaeques Derrida, Le toucher,Jean LucNanq (paris: Galilee), p. 218.
All further referenees will be cited as LT in the body of the text.
13 Derrida goes on to add that this eeonomic relationship is also at
the same time a relation of violenee and nonviolenee (188/128-9). The
question of violenee in the works of Levinas and Derrida has been the subjeet
of much eonttoversy, whieh eannot be broached here.
14 We know from Plato's Sophistthat to be other is to be other than
something else: "other is always said relative to other [Pros heteron]." Plato,
Sophist, Loeb Classieal Library, vol. VII, trans. Harold North Fowler
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996 [1 st ed. 1921]), 255d. Stanley
Rosen, in Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983), 271, renders this passage as: "whatever is other is
neeessarily this specifie nature with respeet to another" (255d6-7). Also see
Parmenides13ge and 164c. Derrida notes that even though the other is always
saidpros heteron, this "does not prevent it from being an eidos (or agenre [genus]
in a noneoneeptual sense) that i~ from being the same as itself," as long as we
understand this sameness to involve alterity (186/127).
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Tbe notion of the other in Plato, whether allo or heteron, is especially
difficult to comprehend, particularly in the later dialogues. See Ste11a Sandford's
excellent "Plato and Levinas: The Same and The Other:'Journal of the British
Socie!JJor Phenomenology 30:2 (l\1ay 1999): 131-150. Sandford citesJean Wahl,
who in 1926 wrote that the other is ''tmable to be grasped [insaisissable] by
pure conceptual thought;' and Paul Ricoeur, who calls the other "the most
ungraspable [insaisissable] of the categories" (141).
15 See my essay "'(:'a me regar&: Regarding Responsibility in Derrida:'
forthcoming.
16 For two penetrating analyses of Derrida's reading of the notion
of the other in Husserl in "Violence and Metaphysics," see Robert Bernasconi,
''The Alterity of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien," in The Face of
the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosop~ of Emmanuel Levinas, ed.
Jeffrey Bloechl (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000) and Leonard
Lawlor, Derrida and HusserL· The Basic Problem of Phenomenology (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002).
17 When discussing Levinas's work in "Violence and Metaphysics,"
following Levinas's own practice in Totali!J andInftni!J, Derrida uses autruiand
l'autre synonymousl)T. It should be noted that, evenwhen providingan account
of the charaeteristics of the other in Levinas, Derrida consistently uses l'autre
in the lower case. Autrniis a term that does notbelong to Derrida's terminology.
18 "Tbe absolutely other is Autrui [L'absolument AutreJ c'est Autrnt]."
Emmanuel Uvinas, Totdile et inftni: Essai surl'extmorite (fhe Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1961), 28. All page references in this essay are to the Livre de poche
edition; translated by Alphonso Lingis as Totali!J and Inftni!]: An Essay on
Extmori!] (pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969),39. Hereafter cited
throughout in the body of the text as TI, with the page references first to the
French, then to the English.
19 One cannot but hear in the words plus tOt, "even earlier," echoes
of another word, plut6t, "rather." Rather, Derrida seems to be asking, what
does autre mean before its Greek and Judeo-Christian determinations?
20 The "thou" is an obvious reference to Buber's work which is
founded on an ontology and a theology of the "l'entre-deux."
21 It is clearly not possible to fully substantiate this claim in the
space of one essa)T.
22 Jacques Derrida, Adieu aEmmanuel Livinas (paris: Galilee, 1997),
100; tmnslated by Pascale-Anne Brault and MichaelNaas asAdieu: To Emmanuel
Levinas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999),54.
23 Jacques Derrida and Pierre-Jean Labarierre, Alterites (paris: Osiris,
1986), 81-2. My account of the relation to the other in this section borrows
heavily from this text.
24 For a partial list of Derrida's references to analogy, see the
discussion of "the principle of analogy" in Archeology of the Frivolous, VOice and
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Phenomenon, "Ousia and Gramme" and "White Mythology" (where metaphor
is called "the manifestation of analogy'') in Margins oj Phi/osopqy, "Plato's
Pharmacy" in Dissemination, "Parergon" in The Truth in Painting (where Derrida
notes the connection between anthropo-theologism and analogism),
"Economimesis," " To Speculate----on 'Freud'" in The Post Card, On the Name,
Signsponge, "Shibboleth: For Paul Ce1an," and The Giftoj Death.
2S Analogy is also italicized on F.D 148, not reflected in the English
translation on p.l00.
26 This is a quotation from TI 326/293.
'lJ We can find in the writings of Saint Bonaventure references to a
resemblance (similitudo) between creatures and God. In the Commentary on
the Senses he wrote that the likeness of creature to God is a relation of
proportionalitas. The relationship of creature to God is that of the exemplatum
to the exemplar, making every creature a vestigium Dei. For Aquinas, the
foundation of al1 analogy is also the likeness of creatures to God. Analogical
predication is founded on resemblance. In De Veritate Aquinas distinguishes
the resemblance of proportion (convenientiaproportionis) from the resemblance
of proportionality (convenientiaproportionalitas). In the Summa Theologica I Aquinas
writes of an analogy of proportion, analogia secundum convenientiamproportionis,
and proportionality, ana/ogja secundum convenientiamproportionalitas. In Aquinas,
analogy plays an important role as a supplement to human logos in
understanding God. See George Peter Klubertanz, SI. Thomas Aquinas on
Ana/ogy: A Textual AnalYsis and Systematic Synthesis (Loyola University Press,
1960).
28 In an intervi~Levinas clarifies the relation between God and
autmi: "1 cannot describe the relation to God without speaking of my concern
for autrui [ce qui m'engage a I'egard d' autmt]." Adding that in Matth~ 25 the
relation to God is presented as "a relation to another person [I'autre homme]:'
Levinas says: "In autmi there is the real presence of God." See "Philosophie,
Justice et Amour" in Entre nous: Essais sur Je penser-d-l'autre (paris: Grasset,
1991), 120-1; translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav as
"Philosoph)T,Justice and Love" inEntre nous: Thinking-of-The-Other(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998), 109-110, trans. modified.
29 I am here citing the translation used by Alan Bass in Writing and
Difference which differs slightly from the one with which my essay began.
30 In the context of a discussion of the role of art in "Reality and Its
ShadOW:'Levinaswrites of a resemblancewithoutmodel. Historica1lyresemblance
has been understood as a relation between the thing and its image, a comparison
between an image and the original In this extremely rich early essa)T, Levinas
thinks of resemblance as the very movement that engenders the image. The
thing, he writes, resembles itself: See ''La reaJire et son ombre," Les Temps modernes
38 (1948): 771-789; translated byAlphonso Lingis as "Realityand Its Shadow:' in
The Levinas Readet; ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989).
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31 The main Scholastic philosophers (late fifteenth through sixteenth-
centuries) associated with the question of analogy were, of course, Thomas
de Vio (Cajetan), Peter de Fonseca, and Francis Suarez. In Disputationes
metapl[jsicae Suarez wrote: "Every creature is being in virtue of a relation to
God, inasmuch as it participates in or in some way imitates the being (esse) of
God, and as having being, it depends essentially on God."
32 Jacques Derrida, Sauf Ie nom (paris: GaIilee, 1993), 56; translated
byJohn ~ Leave)T, J r. as "Sauf le nom" in On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995),55-6.
33 Jacques Derrida, De Ja grammatologie (paris: Minuit, 1967), 47;
translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as 0/ Grammatology (Baltimore:Johns
Hopkins Universit)T, 1974), 69.
34 Jacques Derrida, "La Differance:' Marges de Ja philosophie (paris:
Minuit, 1972),28; translated byAlan Bass as "Differance,"Marins of Philosopqy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 26-7.
35 Derrida returns to the question of analogy and the Name of God
in Levinas in ''En ce moment meme dans cet ouvrage me voici," P.ryche.
Inventions de l'autre (paris: Galilee, 1987-98); translated by Ruben Berezdivin as
'~t This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am" in Re-ReadingUvinas, eds.
Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1991). Quoting Levinas's words in ''The Name of God According to a
Few Talmudie Texts" where he emphasizes that God refuses all analogy with
beings, Derrida adds that once interrupted, this analogy is again resumed.
Just as there is a resemblance between the face of God and the face of man,
Derrida writes, there is also an analogy between all proper names and the
names of God, which are, in their turn, analogous among themselves.
36 The termsproportio andproportionalitasare from the Latin translation
of Euclid's The Thirteen Books of the Elements, vol. ll. trans. Thomas L. Heath
(New York: Dover, 1956) book 5, def: 3 and 5. The Larin wordproportio
translates the Greek analogia, a translation that already bettays a Platonic
conceptualization of analogy:
37 See Eliane Escoubas, Imago Mundi: Topoloie de l'art (paris: Galilee,
1986), 113. Ana has the same sense as the Larin re or retro. It can also mean
"upward," and in certain circumstances "according to," "in mutual accord,"
"reciprocall)T."
38 The origins of analogy are somewhat obseure. A general theory
of analogywas first developed by Eudoxus (?406-?355 Bq and then codified
by Euclid. Whether credited to the Pythagoreans or their predecessors, the
initial use of analogy was mathematical, where it signified the equality of two
proportions. For the use of analogy in Plato, see RepublicBkVII S08c (analogon
"to stand in a proportion with itself''); 534a C'the proportion [analqgia] between
the things''), S10a-b, 511e, 530d, 534a, S76c; Gorgias 46Sb-c, Phaedo 111a-b;
and Timaeus 29c, 31 C, 32a-c, 69b. Aristotelian analogy also emphasizes the
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relation of "a proportion or equality of two relations" e.g., Nichomachean Ethics
~ 6, 1131a30, Metap~sics 1003a33, 1017a, Rhetorie 111, 10, 1411a1, 1411b5;
111, 11, 1412a; Poetics, Topics 108a7-8,~ 8, 138b24, Politics 1296b. Derrida has
repeatedly linked the problem of analogy and metaphor, noting that, for
Aristode, analogy is metaphor par excellence as it is based on an equality of
relations (Rhetoric, Poetics).
It is well known that Franz Brentano's 1862 Von der mannigfachen
Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1960); edited and
ttanslatOO by Rolf George as On the SeveralSenses of Being inAnstotle (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1975) was influential on Heidegger (see ''Letter
to Richardson''). Brentano situated his work within the tradition of scholastic
philosophy which attributed to Aristode the determining of the manifold
meanings of being in terms of analog)T. However, many commentators of
Aristode have pointed out that for the Stagirite, it is more accurate to say that
Being is saidpros hen and not analogically (e.g., Metapqysics 1003a33). It is the
Late Scholasrics, and not Thomas Aquinas, who equate the Aristotelianpros
hen legomenon with the analogy of attribution. Jean-Fran~ois Courtine's recent
Les categories de l'etre. Etudes de philosophie ancienne et medievale (paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2003) argues quite convincingly that the doctrine of
analogy of being, analogja entis, appears much later in the commentators of
Aquinas such as Capreolus (Jean Cabrol), Cajetan, and Suarez.
In Being and Time Heidegger poses the question: What constitutes
the unity of the universal concept of being? QuotingAristotle in the opening
pages, Heidegger credits him with elevating this problem to a fundamental
level. Being is not a genus, Heidegger notes, and the universality of Being
transcends any universality of genus. In medieval theology being is designated
as a 'transcendens.' According to Heidegger, Aristode himself knew the unity
of this transcendental 'universal' as a unity of analog" but the Schoolmen who
inherited the doctrine of the unity of anaIogy failed to explain how the unity
of being is possible. Not only is the doctrine of the analogy of being not a
solution to the Seinsfrage, Heidegger points out in a lecture course, Aristoteles,
Metap~sik E 1-3, VOn wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, GA 33, 00. Heinrich
Hüni (Frankfort: Klostermann, 1981), 46; ttanslated by Walter Brogan and
Peter Warnek as Aristotle j MetapqysicsE 1-3: On the Essence andActuality of Force
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995),38; but it is the index of "the
most stringent aporia," an "impasse [Ausw~losigkei~."According to Heidegger
it is impossible to illuminate the primary meaning of being until the question
of time is broached.
In Kant, analogy is a "perfect resemblance or similarity of two
relations between two quite dissimilar things [eine unvollkommene Ahnlichkeit
~eier Verhältnisse ~schen ganz unäönlichen Dingen bedeute4." Prolegomena ~ einer
jeden künftigen Metap~sik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten kiinnen (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1957), § 58, 124, Ak. 357-8; translated by James W.
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Ellington as Prolegomena to a'!Y Future Metap~sics, Paul Carus trans. revised
(Indianapolis: Hack.ett, 1977), 98. Analogy is then a matter of resemblance
[Ahnlichkei~ and relations [Verhältnisse]. Operating everywhere in the Critique
ofJudgment, analogy attempts to bridge the abyss between the two absolutely
heterogeneous worlds of Nature and the Ethical. As Derrida writes in The
Truth in Painting, "the recourse to analog)', the concept and the effeet of analogy,"
in Kant "are or make the bridge itself" (43/36). See, for example, Critique of
JudgmentAk. 464. Derrida also underscores "the connection between anthropo-
theologism and analogism" in the Third Critique: "the principle of analogy is
here indeed inseparable from an anthropocentric principle. The human center
also stands in the middle [au milieu], between nature (animate or inanimate)
and God" (133-4/117). For a guide to the question of analogy in Kant, see
Fran~ois Marty, La naissance de Ja metapqysique chez Kant. Une etude sur Ja notion
kantienne d'analogie (paris: Beauchesne, 1980).
39 Jacques Derrida, ''La mythologie blanche," Marges de Ja philosophie
(paris: Minuit, 1972), 290; translated by Alan Bass as ''White Mythology,"
Margins of Philosop!?J (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 243.
40 Jacques Derrida, "Economimesis" in Mimesis des articulations (paris:
Aubier-Flammarion, 1975),85; translated by RichardKlein as ''Economimesis''
Diacritics 11, 2 (1981): 19.
41 Jacques Derrida, "La pharmacie de Platon," La dissemination (paris:
Seuil, 1972), 133; translated by Barbara Johnson as "Plato's Pharmacy,"
Dissemination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 117.
42 Jacques Derrida, "Comme si c'etait possible:' Revue internationale
dephilosophie 205,3 (1998): 497-529, p. 524.
43 Referring to DifftcultFreedom Derrida states that the ethical relation
is a religious relation (142/96). The source of concern for Derrida is that
Levinasian ethics inevitably leads to "religion," "not areligion, but the religion,
the religiosity of the religious" (142/96). Levinas defines religion in Totality
andInftnity in the following ways: "We propose to call religion the bond [Ie lien]
that is established between the same and the other without constituting a
totality" (TI 30/40) and "For the relation between the being here below and
the ttanscendent being that results in no community of concept or totality-
a relation without relation-we reserve the term religion" (TI 78-9/80). Trus
term is, of course, revisited by Derrida in "Foi et savoir: Les deux sources de
la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison." In La Religion. Eds.Jacques Derrida
and Gianni Vattimo (paris: Seuil, 1996); translated by SamuelWeber as "Faith
and Knowledge: The Two sources of 'Religion' within the limits of Mere
Reason:' in Religion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
44 Both Hent de Vries, from whose work I have benefited greatly,
and John Caputo have written extensivelyon Derrida's writings on religion.
See Hent de Vries, Philosopqy andthe Turn to Religion (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999) and Religion and Violence: Philosophical Perspectives from
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Kant to Derrida (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002) andJohn
Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion wi/hout Religion
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
45Jacques Derrlda, "Psyche: Invention de l'autre," in P!ychi. Inventions
Je I'aum (paris: Galilee, 1987-98), 61, translated by Catherine Porter as "Psyche:
Inventions of the Other," in Reading DeMan Reading, eds. Lindsay Waters and
Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989),61.
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